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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the risk and return characteristics from a merger arbitrage 
trading strategy in Germany for the first time.  The extant literature focuses 
mainly on data sets from Anglo-American based jurisdictions with mixed results.  
We argue that because in Germany i) acquisition laws bias consideration toward 
cash bids thereby decreasing the uncertainty of announced transactions (versus 
share offers) and ii) the Aufsichstrat (supervisory board with employee 
participation) has corporate governance oversight over any proposed merger such 
that only bids tacitly approved by it are likely to be announced in the first instance, 
a merger arbitrage trading strategy in a German setting will have different risk and 
return characteristics.  To estimate the significance of merger arbitrage returns 
we construct a realistic measure of risk arbitrage which factors in transaction costs 
and other practical limitations encountered by arbitrageurs employing this strategy.  
We also construct two additional portfolios, an equally-weighted portfolio and a 
value weighted portfolio, for comparison purposes. The results show that the 
practical risk arbitrage manager portfolio fails to outperform on a risk-adjusted 
basis indicating that insofar as the German setting yields benefits in the form of 
lower risk, these are properly priced by the market. 
 
JEL classification numbers: G11, G15, G34 
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1  Introduction  
 
Merger arbitrage involves the integrated purchase and sale of shares in companies 
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engaged in acquisitions to capitalise on the spread between the consideration 
offered (cash and/or shares) for a target firm’s shares and the market price of those 
shares [1].  Previous merger arbitrage trading strategy research has focused on 
the US, Canadian, and UK markets — all of which have similar legal and internal 
corporate governance systems — for different periods and the results have been 
inconclusive [2][3][4][5][6].  For the first time this paper investigates the 
profitability of the merger arbitrage strategy which involved firms listed on the 
German stock exchange, arguing that because Germany’s corporate governance 
structures and acquisition laws are likely to combine to decrease merger risk 
relative to previously researched jurisdictions, an analysis of the risk-adjusted 
characteristics of the merger arbitrage strategy in a German setting is merited. 
 
Germany operates a two tier corporate governance structure versus the one-tier 
board structure in the Anglo-American jurisdictions where previous merger 
arbitrage research was undertaken [7][8].  The Aufsichtsrat — a supervisory 
board which is comprised of an equal number of employee and shareholder 
representatives — is particularly relevant for this study because one of its main 
roles is to confirm all corporate actions, of which proposed mergers are an 
example.   Indeed, Köke argues that the Aufsichtsrat is likely to have a profound 
effect on the probability of any announced acquisitions completing successfully 
[9].  Another factor likely to impact of the successful consummation of 
announced acquisitions is that German takeover law makes share offers more 
difficult and so biases consideration toward cash.  These stipulations decrease the 
likelihood that announced mergers will fail, and so decrease the uncertainty of a 
merger arbitrage strategy involving German firms. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of setting in the merger 
arbitrage process.  Cornelli and Li argue that arbitrageurs can impart demand 
side pressure via their holdings to influence outcomes of announced mergers [10].  
This paper adopts a sell side approach to argue that the corporate governance and 
legal setting can also influence outcomes.  To test this hypothesis we follow the 
prior literature by creating a simulated risk arbitrage portfolio using high 
frequency daily data in a manner ascribed to practitioners [11]. To construct the 
simulated portfolio a long position is taken in the target equity and a simultaneous 
short position is taken in the consideration, creating a merger arbitrage position 
that captures deal spreads.  We then combine the merger arbitrage positions into 
three portfolios: an equally weighted portfolio; a value weighted portfolio; and a 
real world portfolio which controls for transaction costs and capital constraints.  
We use multi-factor asset class pricing models, which have been specified 
extensively in the hedge fund and mutual fund literature to assess risk and 
performance of investment funds, to examine the data generating process of the 
merger arbitrage strategy.  
 
As such this paper represents a robust extension of the extant research in an 
Merger Arbitrage in Germany 31  
alternative setting (i.e. non Anglo-Saxon) where the governance and legal setting 
is expected to favourably impact the risk and potentially the risk-adjusted returns 
to a merger arbitrage strategy. 
 
 
2  Literature Review 
 
When a merger is announced a spread between the target’s share price and the 
consideration (deal price) is established instantaneously.  The size of the spread 
between the target price and the consideration depends on investors’ expectations 
of whether or not the merger will be successfully consummated (ceteris paribus 
the spread will decrease as the consummation date approaches).  Merger 
arbitrageurs attempt to profit from the narrowing spread by purchasing shares in 
the target firm and simply waiting (in all-cash transactions) or by simultaneously 
short-selling shares in the acquirer (in all-share transactions). 
 
Drawn by the high reported returns by practitioners, academics have attempted to 
replicate the merger arbitrage strategy in various markets.  Early evidence from 
the US markets, where the majority or merger activity takes place, was that the 
strategy was indeed profitable.  Dukes et al. studied 761 tender offers involving 
US firms between 1971 and 1985 and found that 82% of the transactions to be 
profitable with average abnormal returns of 24.6% [2].  Similarly, Jindra and 
Walkling studied 362 cash tender offers between 1981 and 1995, reporting annual 
returns of 24.0% [3].  Branch and Yang concentrated their research on 244 stock 
swap offers with collars between 1994 and 2003 and estimated annualised excess 
returns of 9.2% [1].  Outside of the US Karolyi and Shannon examined the profit 
potential of a risk arbitrage trading strategy involving Canadian firms [4]. They 
studied 37 transactions valued over CAD$50million which took place in 1997, 
reporting an annualised excess return of 33.9% 
 
A criticism of academic risk arbitrage research is that the studies often ignore 
practical factors.  Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny argue that the textbook definition 
of arbitrage is unrealistic because the strategy can be hindered by real world 
factors which, if not accommodated in the analysis, can bias prior performance 
estimates upwards [12].  With this in mind, more recent research has attempted 
assess whether the reported excess returns are robust to the accommodation of 
such practical limiting factors.  For instance, in their study of a diversified 
portfolio of 1,901 cash and stock mergers and acquisitions risk arbitrage positions 
from 1981–1996, Baker and Savasoglu constrained the risk bearing capacity of the 
arbitrageur to better reflect reality [13].  The authors observed returns ranging 
from 0.6–0.9% per month for the sample period (annual return 7.2–10.8%), with 
estimated positive excess returns of a more modest 3.6% per annum.  Similarly, 
based on a comprehensive sample of 4,750 transactions spanning from 1963 to 
1998, in the knowledge that in the real world transaction costs prevent rational 
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traders from fully eliminating inefficiencies, i.e. make arbitrage costly (Pontiff, 
2006). Mitchell and Pulvino controlled for transaction costs and generated 
abnormal returns of just 4.0% per annum [11].   
 
Extending the research outside of a North American setting Maheswaran and Chin 
Yeoh and Kearney et al. studied returns to merger arbitrage in Australian and UK 
settings, respectively [6][5].  Maheswaran and Chin Yeoh find that merger 
arbitrage generates statistically and economically significant excess risk-adjusted 
returns when the portfolios are benchmarked against the CAPM and Fama and 
French three-factor models [15], but only before transaction costs [6].  Kearney, 
Hutchinson and Cotter include transaction costs and limitations on investing 
capital to reflect real world constraints in their study [5].  The authors find 
evidence that excess returns are robust to the accommodation of these practical 
limiting factors in the UK generating 2.5% per annum.  They also find that, 
contrary to prior evidence, the strategy produced consistently positive returns with 
a low variance, i.e. there is almost no significant relationship with equity market 
risk factors over the sample period.  
 
What is evident from is the extant research is that all of the prior studies are 
located in jurisdictions with Anglo/American (outsider) governance characteristics 
(i.e. US, Canada, Australia and the UK).  Shleifer and Vishny identified agency 
problems as one of the limiting practical factors that might hinder the success of a 
merger arbitrage strategy [12].  Although the agency problem to which they refer 
is that between the brains and the resources involved in implementing the strategy, 
the agency problems that exist within both companies involved in an announced 
merger are also likely to impact both on the consideration in that merger as well as 
the probability of that merger being successful, and so impact on the risk-adjusted 
returns from a merger arbitrage strategy based thereon. 
 
2.1 The German Setting 
There are differences in corporate governance and legal systems across countries 
which, for the purposes of this study, are likely to impact the outcome of those 
mergers.  At one extreme of the corporate governance landscape is the 
Anglo-American system found in the US, Canada, Australia and the UK which, 
because ownership tends to be diffuse, has rules designed to promote shareholder 
value.  At the other extreme is the Continental system found in Germany where 
management have responsibilities to multiple stakeholders, including employees, 
which limit management’s ability to engage in activities which are in line with 
their own interests. Specifically, German corporation law (the Aktiengesetz), 
requires all public companies to have two boards: a management board called a 
Vorstand and a supervisory board called an Aufsichtsrat (half of which, in large 
firms, is comprised of employee representatives).  Not only must the supervisory 
board approve all major business decisions (of which a merger is an example), but 
a supermajority is also required such that this study contends that the Aufsichstrat 
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will likely materially impact on the consideration offered, the probability of 
success, and hence on the risk-adjusted returns from a merger arbitrage strategy 
involving firms listed on the German stock exchange.  
 
Germany’s legal system pertaining to business combinations is also likely to 
influence merger arbitrage outcomes.  Takeovers of public companies in 
Germany are regulated by the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act 
(Wertpapiererwerbs-und Übernahmegesetz) which, due to stipulations contained 
therein, biases consideration toward cash bids.  One such stipulation is that any 
shares offered as consideration for a German firm must be tradable on a regulated 
market within the European Economic Area (EEA) making share offers more 
complicated for non-EEA bidders.  Another stipulation is that any proposed 
merger must be approved by a majority of 75% of the share capital of both entities 
(target and bidder) represented at each of the two shareholder meetings.  In 
addition, dissenting target shareholders can challenge the majority agreed 
exchange ratio in the courts and, if successful, the bidder will have to pay to all 
target shareholders (and not only those dissenting) extra amounts in cash as 
determined by the court.  
 
Given the inconclusive results from Anglo-American settings and the likely 
impact of German takeover law and governance structures on the risk of mergers, 
this research aims to examine if positive excess risk arbitrage returns are 
achievable from a merger arbitrage trading strategy in the German market.   
 
 
3  Data and Methodology 
 
The initial sample is all merger and acquisitions activity by publicly traded 
companies on the German market between the 1st January, 2003 and 1st June, 
2007 for a total of 83 possible transactions.  As a result of the relatively small 
number of all-share transactions on the German market during the sample period 
as well as the lack of available date on some mergers (i.e. where the information 
necessary for the study was not available from any source), the focus of this 
research is on a revised total final sample of 61 all-cash and cash-and-share 
transactions only for transactions (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Mergers and Acquisitions Sample 
Announcement 
Date
Conclusion 
Date
Acquirer Target
2007
12/12/2006 31/03/2007 Golman Sachs Group Inc (US) Bayerische Hypo-und Vereins bank AG
30/11/2006 10/01/2007 PerkinElmer Inc (US) Evotec Technologies Gmbh
23/11/2006 23/11/2006 Capital & Regional PLC (UK) HAHN-Immobilien-Beteiligungs AG
04/12/2006 03/01/2007 BNP Paribus SA (FR) Lafarge Roofing Gmbh
11/12/2006 18/01/2007 Fujitsu Ltd (JP) TDS Informationstechnologie AG
30/01/2007 26/03/2007 Belden CDT Inc (US) Hirschmann Automation & Control Gmbh
22/01/2007 24/05/2007 Areva SA (FR) Repower Systems AG
26/03/2007 28/03/2007 Porsche AG (GM) Volkswagen AG
2006
06/12/2005 06/12/2005 Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC (IR) Der Praktiker Bau-und Heimwerkermarkt AG
12/12/2005 13/04/2006 Kemet Corp (US) Epcos AG
14/12/2005 01/01/2006 Inter pipeline Fund (CA) Tanklager-Gesellschaft Hoyer mbh
31/10/2005 31/12/2005 Hg Capital Duerr AG
12/01/2006 01/03/2006 Pfizer Inc (US) Sanofi-Aventis SA
22/02/2006 01/06/2006 Silgan Holdings Inc (US) Amcor Ltd
16/02/2006 04/03/2006 Dr Reddy's Laboratories Ltd (IN) Betapharm Arzneimittel Gmbh
27/03/2006 27/03/2006 Goldman Sach Group Inc (US) KarstadtQuelle AG
23/03/2006 29/12/2006 Bayer AG (GM) Schering AG
13/04/2006 13/06/2006 Pfizer Inc (US) Schwarz Pharma AG
13/07/2006 13/07/2006 Record Realty (AU) Deutsche Telekom AG
29/06/2006 31/07/2006 Archstone-Smith Trust (US) Deutsche WohnAnlage Gmbh
20/06/2006 31/07/2006 Macquarie Bank Ltd (AU) Petroplus International NV
05/07/2006 07/09/2006 SCOR (FR) Revios Rueckversicherung
06/07/2006 06/07/2006 Delphis NV (BE) Team Lines Gmbh & Co KG
17/09/2006 28/02/2007 Telecom Italia SpA (IT) AOL Deutschland Gmbh
27/09/2006 27/09/2006 IVG Immobilien AG (GM) CS Euroreal
25/09/2006 17/10/2006 OPG Groep NV (NT) DIA Real Gmbh
05/10/2006 31/12/2006 Fonciere des Regions SA (FR) Morgan Stanley Real Estate Fund LP
25/09/2006 28/12/2006 UCB SA (BL) Schwarz Pharma AG
23/10/2006 23/10/2006 Morgan Stanley (US) Commerz Grundbesitz Investment Gmbh
26/10/2006 22/01/2007 Global Equity Partners (AS) Varta Microbattery Gmbh
2005
23/11/2004 13/01/2005 Agfa-Gevaert NV (BE) GWI
16/12/2004 07/04/2005 MobilCom Holding Gmbh (GM) Strato AG
10/12/2004 19/04/2005 Heidelberg Cement AG Teutonia Zementwerk AG
13/01/2005 31/03/2005 Metra Oy (FN) Deutz Power Systems Gmbh
23/12/2004 15/04/2005 Deutsche Immobilien Chancen (GM) Frankfurter Sparkasse Gmbh
28/01/2005 15/04/2005 BASF AG (GM) Merck KGAA
01/03/2005 24/03/2005 Australian Infrastructure Fund (AU) Hochtief Airport Gmbh
01/07/2005 01/09/2005 Danaher Corp (US) Leica microsystems AG
05/08/2005 01/02/2006 Axel Springer Gmbh (GM) ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG
13/10/2005 12/04/2006 Blackstone Group LP (US) Cleanaway Deutschland Holding Gmbh
14/10/2005 28/02/2006 Fresenius AG (GM) Helios Kliniken Gmbh
17/11/2005 31/03/2006 Commerzbank AG (GM) Eurohypo AG
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Table 1: Continued 
Announcement 
Date
Conclusion 
Date
Acquirer Target
2004
23/12/2003 29/06/2004 Uniqa Versicherungen (AS) Mannheimer AG Holding
13/01/2004 13/01/2004 Nufarm Ltd (AU) BASF AG (GM)
12/02/2004 12/02/2004 Hg Capital (UK) Hirschmann Electronics Gmbh & Co Kg
23/02/2004 31/03/2004 Hewlett-Packard Co (US) Triaton Gmbh
15/03/2004 01/10/2004 United Technologies Corp (US) Linde AG
23/04/2004 23/04/2004 Monster Worldwide Inc (US) Jobpilot AG
22/06/2004 01/09/2004 Eaton Corp (US) Walterscheid Rohrverbindungstechnik Gmbh
07/10/2004 03/12/2004 Praxair Inc (US) Air Liquide SA
01/11/2004 10/02/2005 BorgWarner Inc (US) BERU AG
2003
12/12/2002 06/01/2003 Xstrata PLC (SZ) Metaleurop SA
27/12/2002 13/06/2003 Gaz de France Preussag Energie Gmbh
18/03/2003 05/01/2004 Assa Abloy AB (SW) Black & Decker Corp
18/03/2003 02/09/2003 Procter & Gamble Co (US) Wella Ag
15/04/2003 30/06/2003 Deceuninck NV (BE) Thyssen Polymer Gmbh
14/05/2003 31/07/2003 Royal Bank of Scotland Group (UK) Santander Direkt Bank AG
15/08/2003 09/10/2003 Getinge AB (SW) Siemens Medical Solutions
12/09/2003 02/02/2004 Dow Chemical Co (US) Celanese AG
13/10/2003 03/06/2004 Fairchild Corp (US) Eurobike AG
14/11/2003 27/02/2004 Agilisys International (US) Infor Business Solutions AG
  
This table presents the revised sample of 61 merger and acquisitions analysed in this study and 
presents the announcement dates, conclusion dates, name of the acquirer, name of target and type 
of consideration.  
 
Detailed information about each of these 61 transactions was collected from 
“Acquisitions Monthly”, a worldwide publication, which records merger and 
acquisition activity in the Eurozone.  Bloomberg was used to supplement the data 
collection process.  For each merger the target and acquirer, the value of the 
merger, the payment methods, the announcement date, revision date and 
conclusion date, as well as the details of failed transactions are collected.  The 
announcement date of an offer is defined as the date at which the formal offer is 
made public.  Although it is well documented in the research that 
pre-announcement rumours can cause considerable share price movements, for 
practical purposes this research uses the actual offer date to determine the starting 
point of the transaction.  The determination of the conclusion date depends on 
whether the transaction was successful or unsuccessful.  For successful bids the 
conclusion date is the date when successful bids are determined wholly 
unconditional; for unsuccessful bids the conclusion date is defined as the date 
when a public announcement is made concerning the failure of the transaction.   
 
All returns are calculated for all transactions while active from the date that they 
were publicly announced until one-week after the conclusion of the merger to 
allow the market sufficient time to fully digest the impact of the transaction on the 
companies involved.  Information about share prices, dividends, the risk free rate 
of return, the market rate of return, and the return inputs for the Fama and French 
three factor model used in this study are collected from DATASTREAM.  The 
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risk free rate of return used is the 1-month German euro mark middle rate and the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) price index Germany is used to 
represent the market rate of return.  The other two components of the Fama and 
French three-factor model are the HML (value stocks minus growth stocks) and 
the SMB (small cap. stock minus large cap. stocks).  The HML factor was 
obtained by using the FTSE Germany value stocks index and the FTSE Germany 
growth stocks index.  The SMB factor is, due to the lack of available small and 
large indices from the same vendor, obtained by using the FTSE International 
small cap index Germany and the FTSE Germany large cap index.  Capital which 
is idle during the period of investment is assumed to earn the risk free rate of 
return. 
 
3.1 Calculating Returns 
There are two sources of return from merger arbitrage. The main source of return 
is the spread, i.e. the difference between the price at which the arbitrageur 
purchases the targets stock and the price offered by the acquiring company.  The 
other source of returns comes in the form of any dividends received from the long 
position held in the target company’s stock which can, in certain circumstances, 
have a significant impact on the overall calculation of returns. The formula used to 
compute the daily returns for individual deals is: 
 
 
where Rit is the return for deal “i” on day “t”, P
 T
it is the closing price of the target 
company “i” on day “t”, P Tit-1 is the closing price of the target company “i” on day 
“t-1” and D Tit is the dividend receivable form the target company “i” on day “t”.  
 
The returns are calculated for the week prior to the announcement date and for 
each day thereafter that the deal is deemed active.  The value of the long position 
is included in the portfolio at the close of trading on each day, however the returns 
are not realised until the deal is complete.  If a transaction is unsuccessful, the 
arbitrageurs may have to sell the target company’s stock at its market price to 
close out the position, a price which might be substantially lower than the original 
purchase price thereby yielding a negative return. 
 
A transaction that consists of a combination of both cash and shares is treated as if 
it is a stock swap deal.  The reasoning for this is that it is assumed that the market 
incorporates the cash element of the deal and thus is included in the share price of 
the target firm. To do this the arbitrageur simultaneously takes a long position in 
the shares of the target company and a short position in the shares of the acquirer.  
In order to maximize returns from this situation, shares in both companies must be 
held (long or short) by arbitrageurs in a ratio which reflects the proposed offer 
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price. The number of shares needed by the arbitrageur is calculated by the share 
exchange ratio agreed between the acquiring and target company.  
 
There are three sources of profit, which may be obtained by an arbitrageur if this 
strategy is employed.  The first is the difference between the price obtained from 
short selling the shares of the acquirer and the price at which the target stock is 
purchased. The second source of profit is realised from the dividend paid on the 
investment in the target company’s stock.  Unlike all-cash transactions the 
contribution of dividend yield to the return when shares are involved can be 
miniscule or non-existent (or even negative) because dividends payable on the 
short position offset any gains from the dividends receivable on the long position. 
The third source of return available to large institutions and hedge funds is the 
interest earned (typically at the risk free rate) from the proceeds from short selling 
the acquirer’s shares.   The formula for calculating the return on cash and share 
mergers is: 
 
where, superscript T refers to the target, superscript A refers to the acquirer, Δ 
represents the hedge ratio i.e. the number of shares in the acquiring company to be 
exchanged for each target share, rf is the risk free rate of return, P
 A
i1 represents the 
acquirers stock price at the close of market on the day following the merger 
announcement, and Position Valuet-1 is the value of the overall position on the 
previous day calculated as (P
T
it-1 + Δ P
A
it-1).  All other variables are as 
previously defined. 
 
Once the transaction is successfully completed, the arbitrage returns are realised 
from the spread observed on the announcement date.  However, if the deal is 
unsuccessful then the arbitrageur is open to downside risk from unwinding both 
the long and short positions previously entered into.  
 
Similar to Mitchell and Pulvino and Kearney et al. , this study establishes three 
separate merger arbitrage portfolios and charts their progress over the sample 
period [11][5].  The first two are the equally weighted (EWRA) and value 
weighted portfolios (VWRA), respectively, both of which ignore transaction costs 
and other practical limitations and are used for the purposes of comparison.  The 
EWRA is calculated by simply averaging returns over 1,160 trading days where 
transactions were active (transactions which are absent are presumed to earn the 
risk free rate of return).  The VWRA takes the relative size (or value) of each 
transaction each day into consideration and uses this relative daily weighting 
(where the sum of all weights each day equals 1) to scale each transaction’s return.  
Similar to the equally weighted portfolio, it is assumed that the risk free rate of 
return can be achieved by transactions that are absent.   
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The third portfolio more realistically emulates the performance of a hypothetical 
risk arbitrage index manager (RAIM) in that it includes transaction costs.  
Because all of the share prices are taken from the Frankfurt stock exchange, the 
relevant transaction costs to be included in the risk arbitrage index manager 
portfolio are sourced from the Deutsche Boerse which provides prices for using 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange trading system (see Table 2).   
 
Table 2: Transaction Costs on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
 Fee Model 
Floor per order 
(€) Value based price 
Cap per 
order (€) 
    
High Volume 0.60 0.48  Basis points 18.00 
    
Medium Volume 0.63 0.504  Basis points 18.90 
    
Low Volume 0.69 0.552  Basis points 20.70 
    
This table presents the transaction costs per order for the equity transactions in the portfolio.  
 
In addition to the inclusion of transaction costs, a limit is placed on the amount of 
investment capital available because, in the real world, arbitrageurs do not have 
unlimited capital to invest [13].  Specifically, as mergers are announced the €1.0 
million capital is invested.  Each transaction is attributed an amount which is 
equally weighted throughout the sample period subject to the condition that no 
investment can correspond to more than 10% of the total portfolio value at any 
time.  This additional condition is in place to protect arbitrageurs from downside 
risk caused by unsuccessful transactions.  Returns calculated from active 
transactions are summed daily.  This is an important process as it provides the 
position value inclusive of open positions over the 1,160 trading days.   
 
3.2 Regression Equations 
Much of the extant literature has attributed the returns achieved by the merger 
arbitrage trading strategy to compensation commensurate with bearing large 
amounts of unsystematic risk, i.e. the inherent risk that the proposed merger will 
not be a success and so expose any shareholders to a large downside.  Any 
investors who own shares in a company subject to an acquisition bid and are 
unwilling to countenance the potential for such a large downside risk will liquidate 
their shareholding soon after the announcement of an offer.  Although these 
investors typically earn a substantial return from an increase in the value of their 
shares almost immediately, this return is less than the total return that could have 
been earned if, assuming the acquisition is successful, they had held the shares to 
the conclusion of the transaction. Therefore, the probability that the proposed 
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merger will fail is the single most important factor in determining the size of the 
discount, or spread, these investors are willing to accept and which is the principal 
source of returns to arbitrageurs.  As a result, arbitrage returns should contain 
very little systematic risk because, as explained, spread is a function of transaction 
specific risk only such that an analysis of the risk-adjusted returns from arbitrage 
is possible. 
 
In order to perform this analysis this study uses two asset pricing models, the 
market model derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and a three 
factor model incorporating a market, size and value factors [15]. The market 
model is a single index model which assumes that all of a stock’s systematic risk 
can be captured by one market factor: 
 
  ,  ~ IID 
where yt is the excess return on each of the three portfolios (EWRA, VWRA and 
RAIM) at time t, RM is the excess return on the MSCI index at time t, and β 
measures the portfolio’s volatility in relation to the market.   
 
The three-factor model takes account of two additional risk factors to give a better 
estimate of the factors affecting the returns of the three risk arbitrage portfolios 
[15].  The additional factors which are said to explain over 90% of stock returns 
are SMB, which stands for small cap. index stocks minus large cap. index stocks, 
and HML, which stands for high book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market 
stocks.  The Fama and French three factor model is: 
 
  , , ,  ~ IID 
where all variables are as previously defined.  
 
The important variable for this study is the intercept (Jensen’s alpha) which 
measures the average return on a portfolio over and above that predicted by asset 
pricing models (given the portfolio's beta and the average market return) and other 
factors, or, in other words, the average abnormal returns generated by an 
arbitrageur. A significantly positive alpha is evidence that the portfolio generates 
positive risk adjusted abnormal returns. 
 
 
4  Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Preliminary statistical analysis was carried out on the return series generated by 
the three risk arbitrage portfolios.  Although the focus of this study is on the 
returns form the risk arbitrage index manager portfolio (RAIM), the returns from 
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the equal-weighted (EWRA), and the value-weighted (VWRA) included in Table 
3, Panel A are useful benchmarks for comparison purposes. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Daily Portfolio Returns 
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
EWRA-Rf 0.002 0.489 -0.136 0.07 6.508 107.4 
VWRA-Rf 0.001 0.156 -0.101 0.03 1.221 17.72 
RAIM-Rf 0.000 0.209 -0.091 0.01 7.029 165.5 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Factors 
MSCI-Rf 0.001 0.072 -0.059 0.00 0.038 4.141 
SMB 0.000 0.039 -0.050 0.00 -0.122 4.082 
HML 0.000 0.026 -0.029 0.00 -0.188 3.743 
Panel C: Cross Correlations Explanatory Factors 
 RM 1.00     
 SMB (0.65) 1.00    
 HML 0.29 (0.28) 1.00   
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the daily returns of the three return series. The 
statistics are analysing three different time series of returns, which span over a four-and-a-half-year 
period from 1/1/2003 to 12/6/2007.  The first portfolio of returns (EWRA) is equally weighted, 
ignoring the practical limitations of risk arbitrage and is averaged across daily returns.  The 
second portfolio of returns (VWRA) is similar to the equally weighted however returns are 
weighted according to the value of market capitalisation and averaged across daily returns.  The 
third portfolio of returns (RAIM) simulates a risk arbitrage index manager and is comparative to an 
actively managed risk arbitrage portfolio. The excess return series generated by the market RM (i.e. 
MSCI-Rf) for the sample period and the size (SMB) and book to market (HML) factors are also 
analysed in Panel B. Panel C presents the correlation coefficients between the 3 explanatory 
factors. 
 
What is immediately evident is that, as predicted, the risk (as measured by 
variance) of the merger arbitrage strategy in Germany is significantly lower than 
that observed in other studies in alternative settings. That said, however, the 
returns are also significantly lower.  The RAIM portfolio generates a positive 
daily excess return of 0.000% for the sample period. The VWRA portfolio 
performs better, earning an excess daily return of 0.001%. The EWRA portfolio 
performs best generating an excess return of just 0.002%, despite ignoring many 
of the practical limitations encountered by risk arbitrageurs. The positive skew 
observed for all return distributions combined with the large kurtosis figure 
indicate a portfolio exhibiting a number of extreme excess returns generally 
observed on profit making days. Overall the results indicate that ignoring 
transaction costs and other real world limiting factors play a major role in earning 
excess returns from employing a risk arbitrage trading strategy (i.e. help explain 
why the equal- and value-weighted portfolios outperform the risk arbitrage index 
manager portfolio) such that ignoring them is entirely unrealistic.   
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Descriptive statistics of the three risk factors are reported in Table 3, Panel B. The 
risk factors have mean returns which are zero over the sample period. It is also 
notable that the variance of the risk factors is considerably lower than the variance 
of the risk arbitrage portfolios. These factors also exhibit negative skewness and 
positive excess kurtosis. This study also employs a correlation analysis to detect 
any relationship that may exist between the individual return series and the Fama 
and French risk factors (see Table 3, Panel C).  The correlation coefficients 
observed from this analysis are as expected. Of note is the high negative 
correlation between SMB and RM which is due to the large cap stocks representing 
a large proportion of the market capitalisation of the MSCI index. 
 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
In order to account for the lower risk and return of the merger arbitrage strategy in 
the German setting, this section of the paper tests the risk-adjusted returns for each 
of the three return series over the test period January 2003 to June 2007. The 
regression results for both pricing models for each portfolio are included in Table 
4. 
 
Table 4: Time series Regression of Risk Arbitrage Returns 
 
y  RM SMB HML Adj R
2
 
EWRA – Rf 0.002 0.578   6.7% 
 (0.03) (0.00)    
EWRA – Rf 0.001 0.667 0.196 0.027 6.8% 
 (0.05) (0.00) (0.09) (0.87)  
VWRA – Rf 0.001 0.594   19.4% 
 (0.21) (0.00)    
VWRA – Rf 0.000 0.652 0.117 -0.025 19.5% 
 (0.27) (0.00) (0.08) (0.78)  
RAIM – Rf 0.000 0.120    1.9% 
 (0.18) (0.00)    
RAIM – Rf 0.000 0.142 0.046 -0.006 1.8% 
 (0.21) (0.00) (0.33) (0.93)  
This table presents the results from regressions run using a market model and a Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model on each of the risk arbitrage return series on the market returns and two 
additional risk factors, SMB and HML.  Where yt is the excess return on the portfolio at time t, 
RM is the excess return on the MSCI index at time t, SMB represents small cap stocks minus large 
cap stocks, HML represents value stocks minus growth stocks, and Rf represents the risk free rate 
of return. p-values from the test of α = 0, and β = 0 (for RM, SMB and HML) are in parentheses.  
 
The results show that alpha is only significant for the equal-weighted regression.  
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Although positive, none of the alphas are statistically different from zero in both 
the value-weighted regression and the RAIM portfolio. Also of interest is that in 
all regression specifications of all three portfolios none of the additional factors 
used in this analysis are significant.  
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
This paper researches the returns to a merger arbitrage setting in the German 
setting. The German market represents an interesting setting for this research 
because the extant literature to date has focused on data sets from 
Anglo-American based jurisdictions with mixed results.  We argue that because 
in Germany i) acquisition laws bias consideration toward cash bids thereby 
decreasing the uncertainty (versus share offers) of announced transactions and ii) 
the Aufsichstrat (supervisory board with employee participation) has corporate 
governance oversight over any proposed merger such that only bids tacitly 
approved by it are likely to be announced in the first instance, a merger arbitrage 
trading strategy designed to profit from the successful completion of announced  
bids is likely to be less risky.  As such, this study is the first to provide robust 
empirical evidence about the risk-return characteristics of the merger arbitrage 
strategy in a non-Anglo American context.  
 
To perform the analysis in this study we construct three portfolios (an equally 
weighted, value weighted and a real world). What is immediately evident is the, as 
predicted, the risk of the merger arbitrage strategy in Germany is lower than those 
reported in Anglo/American settings [5].  In addition, all three portfolios 
outperform the market generating annualised returns of 57.9%, 26.7%, and 14.9%, 
respectively. The relative underperformance under real world conditions indicates 
that practical limiting factors play a major role in earning excess returns from 
employing a risk arbitrage trading strategy (i.e. help explain which the equal- and 
value-weighted portfolios outperform the risk arbitrage index manager portfolio) 
such that ignoring them is entirely unrealistic.  By its very nature, merger 
arbitrage as a trading strategy has significant downside risk and this is reflected in 
the large skew and kurtosis figures observed for each of the risk arbitrage 
portfolios.    
 
To analyse the risk-adjusted returns of the three portfolios we specify two asset 
pricing models, the market model and a Fama and French three factor model, 
incorporating size and value risk factors.  The results show that only the 
equal-weighted portfolio generates significant abnormal returns indicating that 
(versus the value weighted index) larger deals may be more efficiently priced and 
that (versus the RAIM portfolio), once again, transactions costs and real world 
restrictions significantly limit the ability of risk arbitrageurs to generate abnormal 
returns.  In other words, the market more favourable risk setting for merger 
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arbitrage in Germany is effectively priced by the market such that when real world 
conditions are also applied, arbitrageurs cannot generate abnormal risk-adjusted 
returns.  
 
The evidence presented in this paper on merger arbitrage performance has 
important implications for researchers and practitioners. The inclusion of 
transaction costs as well as considering other practical limitations (capital) is 
fundamental to the risk arbitrage index manager portfolio in order for its results to 
be realistic. With the growth in online trading platforms, transaction costs and 
their impact have significantly reduced allowing greater possibility for merger 
arbitrage opportunities to be exploited. As a result, further research regarding this 
topic should factor in the impact of these trading platforms and the competition for 
business between them. 
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